Me: What is qualia and how would MP explain it?

ChatGPT: Qualia refers to the subjective, first-person experiences of perception—the “what it feels like” aspect of sensations. For example, the redness of red, the bitterness of coffee, or the sharpness of pain are often cited as examples of qualia. Philosophers argue that qualia are distinct from the objective, measurable properties of the material world; they focus on the experiential aspect that is inherently private and seemingly irreducible.

From the perspective of Materialist Pragmatism (MP), qualia are material processes, not independent entities or non-material phenomena. MP rejects the reification of qualia as something separate from the body or its processes.

Qualia are the subjective aspects of the brain’s processes, arising from the interaction of the sensory organs, nervous system, and brain. They are not “things” but process properties of the body, specifically the brain as it processes sensory input. For example, the experience of “redness” is a property of how the brain interprets the light wavelength associated with red, based on the structure and functioning of the visual system.

The subjective nature of qualia is not evidence of non-material phenomena; it reflects the way individual material bodies process information differently. Each person’s sensory system and brain create a unique interpretation of the same material reality. This subjectivity does not contradict materialism; it demonstrates the variability of material systems.

MP emphasizes that qualia are not extraordinary or mysterious—they are ordinary processes that occur whenever a material body interacts with its environment. For MP, the “mystery” of qualia arises only when they are artificially separated from the material processes that produce them.

The notion that qualia are irreducible stems from a misunderstanding of abstraction. Qualia are often treated as if they exist apart from the brain and body, but MP would argue this is a reification—a process of treating a subjective experience as if it were a thing in itself. In reality, qualia are fully integrated into the material system of the body.

While the exact experience of qualia is subjective, shared linguistic and cultural frameworks allow us to communicate about them. For instance, the concept of “red” is a shared abstraction based on similar material experiences of seeing a specific wavelength of light. MP explains this shared understanding as a result of the common material structures of human bodies and brains.

MP focuses on the practical role of qualia in survival and adaptation. The sensory experiences we call qualia are vital for interacting with and navigating the material world. They help organisms distinguish between beneficial and harmful stimuli, shaping behavior in meaningful ways.

The “hard problem of consciousness,” which asks how and why qualia arise from physical processes, is dismissed by MP as a misframing of the issue. MP asserts that qualia do not “arise” from physical processes; they are physical processes. The apparent difficulty lies in the tendency to separate subjective experience from the material processes of the brain. Once this separation is rejected, the so-called “hard problem” dissolves.

For MP, qualia are not metaphysical puzzles but ordinary aspects of material processes. They are the body’s way of experiencing and responding to the material world, rooted in the structure and functioning of the sensory organs and brain. By rejecting the reification of qualia, MP grounds them firmly in the material reality of the body, treating them as neither extraordinary nor irreducible, but as a natural part of existence.