Me: Define the hard problem of consciousness and how would MP deal with it?

ChatGPT: The hard problem of consciousness, as formulated by philosopher David Chalmers, refers to the difficulty of explaining why and how subjective experiences, or qualia, arise from physical processes in the brain. While neuroscience can describe the mechanisms underlying perception, cognition, and behavior (the easy problems of consciousness), the hard problem focuses on the question: why does any of this processing feel like something from the inside? In other words, why does the brain’s material activity result in subjective experience, rather than just functioning without consciousness?

Materialist Pragmatism (MP) addresses the hard problem of consciousness by challenging its framing and the assumptions underlying it. MP asserts that the hard problem arises because of reification—the act of treating subjective experiences as if they are separate entities, distinct from the material processes of the brain. MP would argue that subjective experience (qualia) is not something “extra” to be explained but is simply the way certain material processes (e.g., neural activity) feel to the body experiencing them. The “gap” is a conceptual illusion created by language and abstraction.

MP treats qualia as process properties of the brain. Just as heat is a property of molecular motion, subjective experience is a property of the brain’s complex material processes. These properties are intrinsic to the functioning of a material system and do not require an additional explanatory layer.

The hard problem often assumes a dualistic perspective, where the material and the subjective are fundamentally distinct. MP rejects this distinction, emphasizing that the subjective is fully embedded within the material. Consciousness, in MP, is a process carried out by a material body, specifically the brain, and there is no need to posit a separate realm or non-material substance to account for it.

MP emphasizes utility over speculation. Instead of asking “why” consciousness feels like something (a question that assumes the need for a deeper metaphysical explanation), MP focuses on “how” the material processes of the brain generate behavior, decision-making, and subjective reporting. This shift from “why” to “how” aligns with MP’s commitment to addressing practical, observable phenomena rather than engaging in speculative metaphysics.

MP views subjectivity as a natural outcome of complex material systems interacting with their environment. The brain, as a highly sophisticated material organ, processes information in ways that enable the emergence of reflective and self-referential states, which we call subjective experience. These states are no more extraordinary than other material processes; they simply reflect the high complexity of the system.

MP would argue that the hard problem is not a real problem but a product of philosophical confusion. By rejecting dualism and focusing on the material processes that constitute consciousness, MP dissolves the hard problem rather than solving it. For MP, asking why consciousness feels a certain way is akin to asking why water is wet—it is simply how the material system operates.

Materialist Pragmatism addresses the hard problem of consciousness by reframing it as a misunderstanding of the nature of subjective experience. MP sees consciousness as an ordinary process of a material body, specifically the brain, with subjective experience being a property of these processes. The apparent mystery of consciousness arises only when subjective experience is treated as separate from the material processes that generate it. By rejecting dualism and speculative metaphysics, MP concludes that the hard problem is not a genuine obstacle but an artifact of reified thinking and linguistic abstraction.